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Remembering 1965: Abe Fortas
and the Supreme Court
By Larry M. Roth*

With 1965 an era both ended and began. That year the American consciousness over the Vietnam War was truly awakened to the sound of far
off howitzers. Also that year, Abe Fortas was nominated and confirmed by
the Senate for the Supreme Court seat vacated by Arthur Goldberg. The
reverberations of both phenomena still exist although the former permeates our social order much more than the latter. Quite recently, however, we witnessed a positive by-product of the Fortas appointment: the
appointment of John Paul Stevens to the Supreme Court. With Stevens'
nomination the appointive process witnessed a selection procedure that
was open and carefully considered, quite unlike the Fortas affair. The
result was an appointee publicly acknowledged as well qualified and acclaimed by the Bar as its choice with the highest recommendation. The
nominee received wide support and recognition, for, in effect, a wide number of in-government and out-of-government sectors participated in the
selection process. And the nominee was of a judicial tenor for he was
himself a product of the Bench. But Abe Fortas and the year 1965 was a
different time, a different day and a different way of doing things.
The Fortas nomination and eventual ascent to the Court was a throw
back to the 19th-century patron system. In effect, a President of the United
States chose an old friend and political confidant to fill a position that
demanded of an individual the most stringent exercise of political selfrestraint and the highest order of ethical conduct. But such items were not
in the Fortas repertoire. Worse yet, Abe Fortas was appointed to a vacancy
consciously manuevered by Lyndon Johnson so that an old friend would
be rewarded for years of faithful service.
This was not the first time in history that such an event occurred. Many
presidents have looked immediately to old friends and political allies once
a Court vacancy developed. One need only look to such notable examples
as Jackson and Taney, Lincoln and Davis, Truman and Vinson. Last in
the line of these appointments was Abe Fortas. The difference with Fortas
was a more blatant exercise of cronyism and political maneuvering.
The competency of Abe Fortas is not now being questioned, nor is the
facility of his legal mind in doubt. Many have said his intellect rated with
* Partner in the law firm of Rutberg and Roth, Casselberry, Florida. B.S., University of
Tennessee (1973); J.D., University of Florida (1975).
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the Supreme Court's finest. It was the process and its reasons that must
be called into question. For in 1969, when Abe Fortas became the first
Supreme Court Justice to resign before a public outcry of impeachment,
the truths of 1965 became painfully evident. They have become even
clearer today. Since then, the Senate, whose responsibility it is to confirm
Court nominations, has looked with keener scrutiny at the names of the
nominees submitted by the president. Richard Nixon's nominees were the
first to feel this altered and more acute senatorial advice and consent. Now
in the ashes of Watergate, the public demands no less. Gerald Ford was
quick to discern this. It was, perhaps, the finest moment of his administration. This carefulness of consideration and the procedural mechanisms of
the Stevens nomination will hopefully be the basic prototype for the future.
We should have learned by now the uniqueness of Supreme Court Justices. They should be judicially pristine, not politically tainted. But a little
over a decade ago, 1965, a Supreme Court nomination succeeded in thrusting Abe Fortas into the role of "Mr. Justice." The Fortas success, however,
was a throwback into an era that now should be discarded as the country
moves into its Tri-Centennial. The Fortas nomination and Lyndon Johnson's success in promoting it is an example of how not to select a Supreme
Court Justice. This article recounts the 1965 events leading to Abe Fortas'
ascension to the Court.'
THE HOT

SUMMER OF

1965: LBJ

HOLDS THE TRUMP

No appointment a president can make approaches the enduring significance of a Supreme Court nomination. It is a lifetime appointment for the
recipient of the nomination. It is an opportunity for a president to indelibly
stamp an imprint upon the development of American jurisprudence and,
indeed, on American social thought itself. Although there is no guarantee
a Justice will live up to presidential expectations, it's a chance most presidents gladly accept. Few presidents are disappointed. Franklin Roosevelt
was not-he had eight nominations. Thus far it can be said that Richard
Nixon has been satisfied. Dwight Eisenhower was not so fortunate. He
became shocked at Earl Warren's portfolio of liberal decisions. Ike reportedly said later that the Warren appointment was the worst mistake of his
life.
1. For one interested in the life of Abe Fortas prior to his Supreme Court tenure, many
sources are available. Particularly these should be noted: Graham, Abe Fortas, 4 FRIEDMAN
& ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969 (1969); SHOGAN, A
QUESTION OF JUDGMENT (1972); Navasky, In Washington You Just Don't Return a Call from
Abe Fortas, N.Y. Times, August 1, 1971, §6 (Magazine). As far as legal prominence prior to
his coming to the Court, Fortas had much. He argued the cases of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); and Durham v. North Carolina, 214 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Each appointment is a presidential prize. Until the summer of 1965
there was no indication Lyndon Baines Johnson would be awarded such a
gift. But fate was on Johnson's side. In 1965 the White House was his; the
people had given him a landslide victory only one year earlier. In the
Johnson style he played his opportunity for all its worth. In effect he
created his own Supreme Court vacancy.
Adlai E. Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations, died on July 4,
1965, after having suffered a heart attack while in London.' It was a long
way from London, England, to the United Nations, to the Supreme Court
Building, but Lyndon Johnson was about to bring them all closer together.
For in the few days after Stevenson's passing, Johnson already had Justice
Arthur Goldberg's resignation and Abe Fortas on the burner to accept a
Supreme Court appointment.
Arthur Goldberg owed nothing to Lyndon Johnson. His Supreme Court
appointment was for life. Unless impeached, he was beyond the faithless
winds of changing political fortunes. Somehow LBJ was able to get at
Arthur Goldberg, for on July 26, 1965, Goldberg resigned from the Court
and accepted the post of U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
The problem of discerning why Arthur Goldberg left the Court is rooted
in the varying versions of the story offered by the protagonists involved.
According to Lyndon Johnson, in his memoirs The Vantage Point, Goldberg had made it known that he was restless with the sequestered existence
of a Supreme Court Justice. This is what John Kenneth Galbraith told
Johnson on July 16, 1965. Galbraith indicated to the President that Goldberg would step down if offered a more challenging position than the Supreme Court.' Anyone knowing anything about the law knows that few
positions offer more challenges than the Supreme Court. Yet Johnson's
story is founded on the converse.
Johnson related that Goldberg accompanied him to the Stevenson funeral. On that trip he asked Goldberg about the rumors of his
"restlessness." Goldberg allegedly confirmed them as being true. Johnson
then told Goldberg that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
post was available. Goldberg, however, indicated that his interest was in
foreign affairs. The following day Goldberg called the President to relate
his inclination to accept the U.N. position if offered to him. Johnson then
appointed Goldberg to the U.N. 4 Thus, according to Johnson, Goldberg
instigated his own resignation.
From the other perspective, Goldberg's story has been recently told by
his wife Dorothy. In her memoirs recalling those years she emphatically
2. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 108.
3. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT:
(1971).
4. Id.

PERSPECTIVES

OF THE PRESIDENCY

1963-1969, at 543
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states that it was Johnson who instigated the U.N. offer.' Johnson was
persistent in seeking Goldberg's move from the Court to the United Nations, and assured him that as Ambassador, he would have a viable voice
in shaping this country's foreign policy.
Why did Arthur Goldberg leave the Court? Some agree with Johnson
that Goldberg was restless with Court work.' Based upon his lifetime of
being embroiled in the spotlight of a lawyer's work, labor negotiations and
politics, such a theory is not totally without foundation. Action and activity were in Goldberg's past. He had been John Kennedy's Secretary of
Labor before appointment to the Court. But the activity of the Supreme
Court was different. The Court was constant and demanding intellectual
activity, although the physical body moved little from the cloistered chambers of the Supreme Court Building. And, of course, a justice's social
outlets were much more circumscribed.
It seems more to the truth, however, that it was Johnson who approached Goldberg. As a lawyer Goldberg had to recognize the crowning
achievement of being a Supreme Court justice. And that he was one of the
few Jewish justices to have served on the Court. So, Johnson had to consciously maneuver Goldberg out of that office. He thrust upon Goldberg
the request for a new venture; it was a presidential request. The nation
witnessed the persuasive power of a presidential request during Watergate
and its aftermath. When the President beckons his subjects comply. Johnson must have realized that applying direct pressure to Goldberg would
achieve the desired result. He told Goldberg that the U. N. was to be the
vehicle which would achieve a solution to the Vietnam problem, and that
the U.N. Ambassador would be instrumental in that prospect. Even in
1965, however, the U.N. post was not a powerful position. The title over5. GOLDBERG, A PRIVATE VIEW OF APUBLIC LIFE 192-196 (1976). In her book Mrs. Goldberg
explicitly rejects Johnson's contentions that it was restlessness that led Arthur Goldberg from
the Court. Her recitation of these events is interesting in helping to discern Lyndon Johnson's
flip side. Quoting at length from her book, Mrs. Goldberg recounted: "In Johnson's book he
wrote that the reason he asked Arthur to leave the Court and become UN ambassador was
[not only] because of his undeniable ability but also because he had heard that he was bored
with the work on the Court. This statement about'boredom,' which was so contrary to the
truth, outraged Arthur particularly because he had heard from a newspaper man a considerable time before Johnson's book came out that the President had made a similar off-the-record
statement to that reporter. At that time Art had made a point to speak to the President at
the White House to ask him whether he really had made such a statement. The President
denied making the statement and said that he knew of Arthur's great contentment with his
work on the Court and that he was keenly aware of the sacrifice Art made in leaving his
Judicial post." Id. at 222. Later Mrs. Goldberg goes on to point out that, in her opinion, the
real reason Goldberg left the Court was because of the Article 19 crisis. This crisis involved
the Soviet Union, its satellites and France all refusing to pay their UN assessments because
of that organization's intervention in the Congo. Id. at 255-256. It again appears doubtful,
however, that Goldberg would have ever sat in the ambassador's chair had Adlai Stevenson
never died. This in spite of whether the Article 19 dispute would have ever been resolved.
6. See D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 589 (1972).
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shadowed the actual importance of the job. Johnson would have had to
promise that the ambassadorship was to take on a theretofore unknown
importance. For in Goldberg's own words, the President beckoned him "to
join in the greatest adventure in man's history-the effort to bring the rule
of law to govern the relations between sovereign states. It is that or doom.
I have accepted as one simply must." 7
Johnson exercised his presidential muscle in persuading Goldberg. He
wanted his man Abe Fortas in a high governmental office, and an appointment to the Court would satisfy that desire. Accepting an appointment
from him, Goldberg, a previous Kennedy man, would become a Johnson
man. Johnson, never totally secure with the omnipresent legacy of the
martyred Kennedy stalking the White House hallways, thus was able to
pull the coup and make Washington more Johnsonian and less like Camelot. Now, more than a decade after Kennedy appointed Arthur Goldberg
to the Supreme Court, it can be said that Lyndon Johnson undid what the
Constitution guaranteed President Kennedy-an opportunity to nominate
a Supreme Court justice to serve for life. Moreover, the Goldberg resignation was of a different sort from that of James Francis Byrnes in the early
1940's. Then the nation was at war with the Axis. Byrnes was a Roosevelt
appointee and it was Roosevelt himself who asked Byrnes to resign from
the Court to head a vital war-precipitated domestic program. There could
have been no other Rooseveltian motive. Byrnes was needed elsewhere., It
is still questionable whether Goldberg was needed more at the Court or the
U. N. building.
THE FORTAS CONNECTION:
TEN-GALLON POLITICS AND LBJ ARM TwISTING

Those of us who survived the 1960's vividly associate the Johnson years
with the term "credibility gap." Simply stated, our elected leaders did not
tell us all that was happening. Vietnam was a blatant example. The Fortas
nomination was another. The Johnson Administration publicly disclosed
that many prominent names were being considered for the Court vacancy.
Among the notables: Congressman Wilbur Mills (remember this was
1965); Judge Homer Thornberry of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a
long-time Johnson colleague; and Secretary of Labor Williard Wirtz.' But
SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 107.
8. Byrnes resigned from the Court to become Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization, which was established to cope with the effect the war would have on domestic economic
policies. See In Memoriam: Honorable James FrancisByrnes, 93 S. Ct. 16, 20, 35-37 (1972);
Murphy, James F. Byrnes, 4 FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, THE JusTIcEs OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME CpumT 1789-1969, at 2530-2531 (1969). At the time it was said that Byrnes was
accepting " 'a position of highest importance to the carrying out of the war.'" 93 S. Ct. at
16, quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt.
9. ASHBY, SUPREME COURT APPoINTMENTS SINCE 1937, at 309 (1972).
7.
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the politics of Court nominations played against these men. Goldberg had
left vacant the "Jewish seat." This tradition dated back to 1916 when
Woodrow Wilson appointed Louis Dembitz Brandeis.10 Felix Frankfurter
was the next Jewish justice. Goldberg followed. LBJ was not inclined to
buck precedent. Admittedly, the precedent rested on dubious logic, but it
had important political consequences. Thus, Senator Abraham Ribicoff
and Professor Paul Freund of Harvard were added to the list." This list,
unlike what the Administration declared, in reality never existed. Johnson
perpetuated this myth in The Vantage Point, his memoirs of the presidential years:
Finally, after studying the list these advisors had compiled, I concluded
that there was only one man whose legal qualifications and character I
well knew who could take Goldberg's place. I was confident that the man
would be a brilliant and able Jurist. He had the experience and the liberalism to espouse the causes that both I and Arthur Goldberg believed in.
He had the strength of character to stand up for his own convictions, and
he was a humanitarian. That man was Abe Fortas ....
11
A study of the chronology of events leading to the Fortas nomination
dispels the myth. No list existed. No alternatives were considered.
According to Johnson, he carefully studied the list of nominees but found
them unacceptable. This appears unlikely. By his own account, Johnson
first learned of Goldberg's desire to leave the Court on July 16.1 Yet other
sources, including Mrs. Johnson, report that the President initially approached Abe Fortas on July 16.' By Johnson's calculations he had offered
the job to Fortas before the substance of Goldberg's alleged restlessness
with Court life was confirmed by Goldberg himself. It seems, therefore,
that Johnson was offering Fortas an appointment to a seat on the Supreme
Court not yet vacated. Johnson approached Fortas early enough so that on
July 19, by Johnson's own account, and one day prior to Goldberg's agreeing to take the U.N. position if offered, Fortas would write the President:
But after painful searching I've decided to decline-with a heart full of
gratitude. Carol thinks I should accept this greatest honor that a lawyer
could receive-the highest appointive post in the nation.' 5
The language of the Fortas letter rejecting the appointment indicates a
lengthy contemplation of the Johnson offer by the soon-to-be justice.
10. See SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 109. See also TODD, JUSME ON TRLAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS (1964).
11. See note 9, supra.
12. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 544.
13. Id. at 543.
14. See SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 110; JOHNSON supra note 3; JOHNSON, A WHrrE HOUSE
DLARY 299-300 (1970).
15. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 544.
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What must be surmised from these events is that Johnson had previously developed a plan to appoint Fortas prior to any Court vacancy.
This offer preceded Johnson's efforts to lure Goldberg from the Court. It
was a power play by Johnson to establish a Court vacancy, then appoint a
Johnson man and remove a Kennedy appointee. (LBJ was accused of a
similar tactic in 1967 with the appointment of Ramsey Clark as Attorney
General, precipitating the resignation of his father, Tom Clark, from the
Court and the eventual appointment of Thurgood Marshall to fill the slot.)
Whatever Abe Fortas' explanation of this series of events is will never be
known since his memoirs will not be written."6 In the final analysis, however, it becomes inescapable that Lyndon Johnson was acutely conscious
of pressuring Goldberg into resignation after having approached Fortas
about being the successor for any appointment. Ironically, it was easier for
Johnson to secure a Court vacancy than it was to convince Fortas to don a
judicial robe.
Johnson first approached Fortas with the Court appointment when the
two families were dining on the Truman balcony at the White House."
"Abe was moved, quiet, grateful. Before Lyndon leaves the office, I would
like so much to see that happen. I think he would be a credit to the court."' 8
So wrote Lady Bird Johnson that same day. Three days later Fortas declined the President's offer. Johnson was distressed. He had once before
attempted to entice Fortas to government service. After Robert Kennedy
resigned as Attorney General, the post had been offered to Fortas, but he
had declined. 9
July 21, 1965, found Fortas at the White House again. He was meeting
with Mrs. Johnson over plans for the Johnson library at the University of
Texas. He gave his reason for declining the job as his commitment to the
law firm.20 Also playing a role in this decision was his recent purchase of a
$250,000 Georgetown home, a $100,000 mortgage and a $200,000 a year
salary as a senior partner with Arnold, Fortas & Porter.2 ' The Supreme
Court paid $39,500. As he also explained to Mrs. Johnson, if he were on
the bench he would be unable to come to the President's aid if any real
trouble arose. Fortas was thinking in terms of his role as a presidential
trouble-shooter. Already Fortas had rendered valuable services to the President: traveling on a sensitive mission to the Dominican Republic, serving
as attorney for the Johnson family trust, and taking charge of the sordid
and sad affair of Walter Jenkins who, as a top presidential advisor, had
16. Rodell, The Complexities of Mr. Justice Fortas,N. Y. Times, July 28, 1968, §6 (Magazine), at 65.
17. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 110.
18. JOHNSON, A WHrrx HousE DiARY 299-300 (1972).
19. Seib and Otten, Abe, Help! - L.B.J., EsQuIRE, June, 1965, at 87.
20. By law firm Fortas was referring to Arnold, Fortas and Porter, one of the biggest
TIlE SuPERiAwYms 95-143 (1972).
establishments in the D.C. legal community. See GouLDnD,
21. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 110.
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been arrested on a morals charge. Moreover, on November 22, 1963, the
first call from Lyndon Johnson in Dallas was to Abe Fortas. He also played
a major role in the organization of the blue-ribbon Warren Commission to
investigate the Kennedy assassination. As a Supreme Court justice it
22
would be impossible for Fortas to continue in such roles.
Fortas was called back to the White House on July 28 for a presidential
news conference. The subject was Vietnam. Upon arriving, the President
met with Fortas personally and quickly reviewed Fortas' objections to the
Court appointment. He then announced: "I've just sent 50,000 men to
Vietnam and I'm sending you to the Supreme Court. ' 23 The challenge of
the Great Society was then thrust upon Fortas. The President was sending
young men off to war and to death. Fortas was only going to the Supreme
Court building. How could he refuse the call? His duty was clear. His
obligation to the President, his longtime friend, was clearer. Johnson wrote
of that occasion: "He [Fortas] looked at me in silence for a moment. I
waited. Then he said 'I'll accompany you.' That was the only way I managed to get him on the Court. 2 1 Johnson seldom lost such confrontations.
In 1965 after a landslide election victory and a public mandate, he was far
from being a loser. In his public announcement of the nomination the
President succinctly described the struggle: "In this instance, the job has
sought the man."2 5 And by that statement Johnson impliedly confirmed
that the appointment was created for Fortas; it was a job molded for Fortas
2
and only Fortas. 1
THE SENATE CONFIRMATION:
RUBBER STAMPING THE RUBBER STAMP

Hearings were convened by the Senate Judiciary Committee on August
5, 1965.27 At the time, the Committee boasted some of the Senate's most
determined conservatives. Many southern senators on the Committee were
somewhat fearful of having Fortas, another liberal, on a liberal Court becoming more liberal every day. The ultimate effect of his liberalism, however, would be confined since Fortas shared many views with Arthur Goldberg. The senators' fear arose nevertheless from the likelihood Fortas
would vote favorably on integration cases, a fact of life which especially
22. See generally Seib & Otten, supra note 19; Rodell, supra note 16, at 12.
23. Graham, supra note 1, at 3015.
24. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 545.
25. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 112.
26. For a recapitulation of the confirmation proceedings on the Fortas nomination, see
Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 CONG. REc. 2054-2079
(1965).
27. See generally Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
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disturbed the southerners. At the time racial tensions permeated the air
in the wake of the riots in Watts.
But the year was 1965. President Johnson was still able to manipulate
the Senate as he did so well as its majority leader. Thus, the Committee
"seemed little disposed to challenge the President's judgment." 2
The hearings began. After permitting the professional anti-communists
to take a crack at Fortas,2' the Committee concentrated, although only
briefly, on the only issue in contention: Would the Abe Fortas friendship
with Lyndon Johnson interfere with his judicial province?" To this Fortas
replied in short order:
There are two things that have been vastly exaggerated with respect to

me. One is to the extent to which I'm a Presidential advisor, and the other
is the extent I am a proficient violinist. I am a very poor violinist but very

enthusiastic, and my relationship with the President has been exaggerated
out of all connection with reality.3'
It was undisputed at the time, however, that Fortas was one of Johnson's
closest confidants. After Johnson became Vice President, Fortas was always close at hand. When White House lawyers prepared the Fair Housing
28. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 114.
29. Hearings,supra note 27, at 8-21.
30. Id. at 46-50. The history of the Johnson-Fortas friendship was both interesting and
long lasting. It was a minor Department of Interior Official, Arthur Goldschmidt, who first
brought together over a proposed public-power project a young New Dealing congressman
from Texas and Goldschmidt's boss in the Department of Interior's power division. These
men were Lyndon Johnson and Abe Fortas, respectively. Rodell, supra note 16, at 12.
Fortas played a major role in seeing to it that Lyndon Johnson's name was on the 1948
Texas senatorial ballot. Johnson had won the democratic primary by a mere 87 votes. His
opponent claimed illegal voting for Johnson. Suit was filed in federal district court which
granted an injunction against the placement of Johnson's name on the November ballot. In
effect this would deprive Johnson the Senate seat since the democratic candidate, whoever
he was, was otherwise assured of victory. Johnson, with the able assistance of Fortas, urged
successfully to have reversed the injunction granted by the district court. Lewis, A Tough
Lawyer Goes To Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1965, §6 (Magazine), at 65-66. See Johnson v.
Stevenson, 1970 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 336 U.S. 904 (1948). See also Johnson v.
Stevenson, 335 U.S. 801 (1948).
This friendship and working relationship continued to mature. Fortas played an important
behind the scenes role in 1949 while Johnson was in charge of a special Senate Commerce
Subcommittee that was set up to study the renomination of Leland Olds as Chairman of the
Federal Power Commission. It was Fortas' responsibility to supply materials and arguments
against the Olds' nomination. And in the mid-1950's Fortas served as part of a three-man
advisory board set up to advise Johnson wile he was the Senate majority leader. EvANs &
NovAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE Excism oF PowER 36, 110 (1966).

31. Hearings, supra note 27, at 50.
Later in responding to a direct question from Senator Roman Hruska on whether the
Johnson friendship would affect his ability to function in the true judicial fashion and tradition, Fortas responded: "The short answer to that is absolutely not .... But I am very
distressed at any suggestion or idea that any relation that I might have with the President
would in any way bear upon the discharge of my functions in the Court." Id.
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order to be enforced by the Vice President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, Johnson requested that Fortas be able, to examine the
document although he had no official government position.2 Fortas'
friendship spilled into the posture of an unofficial presidential advisor. He
aided President Johnson in replacing the old Kennedy men with personnel
more atuned to Johnson's needs.n According to one source who saw the
Johnson Administration from- the inside,
Abe Fortas was the President's confidant, legal sharpshooter, personal
ambassador and Jack-of-all advisors. The White House knew him as the
man Lyndon Johnson would turn to when the problems were especially
important or knotty, and the only advisor treated with a respect not untouched by awe.N
Aside from this concern over the Johnson-Fortas friendship, the Committee made no substantive attempt to delve into Fortas' judicial philosophy.3 5 This seemed odd since the Senate was becoming painfully aware of
the recent Warren Court decisions vastly expanding the rights of the criminally accused. It was suspected by most that Fortas would fit nicely into
the liberal seat of Goldberg and continue the Warren Court's criminal
decisions. This seemed consistent, remembering that Fortas had argued
Gideon v. Wainwright-" two years before. Three hours of testimony later,
the Committee voted unanimously on the Fortas nomination. 37
The full Senate debate was a replay of the Committee hearing. The
minor grumblings echoed concern only with the potential circumvention
of the Separation of Powers Clause due to the Johnson-Fortas friendship.
As noted, Fortas' role in White House affairs was more than that of the
average taxpayer. There was no indication this role would not continue
after Fortas' accession to the Court. 8 The precariousness of this
Separation-of-Powers balance would, unfortunately, depend on the men
involved. But at least one senator recognized the dangers involved. It was
agreed that the friendship-advisor to the President in office could not be
separated from Abe Fortas the Justice. Senator John Williams thus voiced
what has been proved to be historical prescience: "Contrary to the President's claim that he had looked all over America to find the best qualified
men for the job, it is quite obvious that he did not look far beyond his inner
'3 9
circle of friends.
32. EvANs & NovAK, LYNDON B. JoHNsoN: THE ExRmcisE OF POWER 345 (1966).
33. 1966 CuRRENT BIoGRAPHY 102.
34. GOLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY 39-40 (1969).
35. See Hearings, supra note 38, at 41-45.
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally LEwIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1967).
37. ASHBY, supra note 9, at 317.
38. Id.
39. SHooN, supra note 1, at 113. The entire text of the floor debate can be found at 111
CONG. REc. 2054-2079 (1965).
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On August 11, 1965, the nomination was confirmed by oral vote. It was
unanimous. No dissents were recorded. 0 Abe Fortas, on October 4, 1965,
was sworn in as the 95th Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 1
THE VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE: WHY FORTAS?

No one but Lyndon Baines Johnson would have nominated Abe Fortas
for the Supreme Court. This is not, however, to denigrate Fortas' legal
abilities.'4 But of course, no one but Fortas had a friend like Lyndon Johnson. In 1965, Johnson did not forget Abe Fortas for all his years of faithful
service and friendship. He bestowed upon the Tennessean the highest prize
a lawyer can obtain: the Supreme Court. It was a forced prize, a prize not
necessarily sought by Fortas.'3 The steamrolling politics of the Great Society was put in gear and before the conclusion of its journey, Abe Fortas
had traded his Georgetown-navy suit for a black robe. Almost four years
later, when Abe Fortas was the first Supreme Court justice to resign under
public pressure and threatening impeachment, he most likely questioned
the efficacy of the Johnson blitz" and his own seduction to the office. For
Abe Fortas soon discovered, as did the American public, perhaps to the
eternal detriment of the Supreme Court, that old adage: A judicial robe
does not a judge make.
Put in perspective, however, what can be discerned as the real reason
for the Fortas appointment? The Johnson-Fortas friendship was the sole
motivating factor.' 5 Aside from the manipulation of Goldberg as discussed
earlier, this reason becomes even more apparent as one looks to see that
Johnson selected Fortas directly from private practice. It had been 35 years
since Herbert Hoover plucked Owen Roberts directly from private practice. 6 To arrive at his selection Johnson had to be myopic to a long list,
running back twenty preceeding justices selected by five previous Presidents, of lower federal court judges, government officials and law profes40. ASHEY, supra note 9, at 318. See also 11 CONG. REc. 2079 (1965).
41. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 117.
42. "In intellect and breadth of experience and sheer ability as a lawyer, Fortas would
stand high on any list of possible Justices." Lewis, A Tough Lawyer Goes to the Court, N. Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 1965, §6 (Magazine), at 67. See Wukasch, The Abe Fortas Controversy: A
Research Note on the Senate's Role in Judicial Selection, 24 WEST. POL. Q. 24-27 (1971).
43. See SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 112.
44. See, e.g., 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 136-139, 1021 (1969); NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1969, at 3133; LIFE, May 23, 1969, at 38-39; NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1969, at 29-33; Bickel, Mr. Justice
Fortas, NEW REPUBLIC, May 17, 1969, at 9-10; Lambert, The Justice and the Stock
Manipulator,LIF, May 9, 1969, at 32-37. See also 115 CONG. REc. 11259-11267 (1969) (remarks of Senators Miller and Williams); 115 CONG. REc. 11419 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Thurmond).
45. For an account of this friendship see Seib and Otten, supra note 19, at 86-88, 147149. See also ABaAHAM, JUSTICES AND PaESrDENTS 261 (1974).
46. Rodell, supra note 16, at 12.
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sors. Moreover, only Lyndon Johnson's friendship could have persuaded
Abe Fortas to give up the wealthy life of a Washington "superlawyer."' 7
All in all, therefore, the appointment revolved around one factor: the Lyndon Johnson-Abe Fortas camaraderie.
That is it. All else should be discredited. The sequence of events leading
to the Fortas nomination point only to that conclusion.
What is perhaps most interesting about the Fortas-replace-Goldberg
sequence and supportive of the theory that the Fortas nomination was a
friendship appointment, is the fact that no policy change was involved.
Goldberg was considered a liberal. Fortas was a liberal, particularly so in
Johnsonian terminology."8 Goldberg was a Kennedy man, a New Frontier
appointment. But Goldberg was also as closely associated with the New
Frontier qua Great Society as anyone. He, like Fortas, would have ruled
favorably upon any domestic program coming from the Johnson White
House and tested before the Court. In the area of civil rights and the rights
of the criminally accused, both men would have come down on the same
side. 9 Likewise, as with Fortas' recognized talents there was no questioning of Goldberg's intellectual credentials.
Finally, one further justification for the Fortas appointment must be
rejected when confronting this "friendship theory." It has been argued
that, in fact, Johnson sent Goldberg to the U.N. to help soothe the ruffled
feathers of discontented liberal doves who were slowly, if not blindly, beginning to snap at his heels over Vietnam. 50But Goldberg could be no more
effective than had Adlai Stevenson been. Not that the men lacked the
ability, only that the United Nations ambassadorship was impotent in the
formulation of American foreign policy. It has always been and has remained so. This oftentimes lack of persuasive impact would trouble and
frustrate Goldberg throughout his years at the U.N.' And the fact that
Fortas, a liberal, was being moved to the Supreme Court surely had no
dampening effect on Southeast Asian critics nor did it divert their concern
from the bombing of Vietnamese villages. Fortas himself was, in fact,
heavily responsible for the shaping of Vietnam policies in his capacity as
unofficial advisor to the President. 52 This advice continued to flow from
Fortas throughout his years on the Court.5 For instance, after his appointSHOGAN, supra note 1; 1966 CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 102-103.
48. "Fortas subscribed completely to Johnson's Great Society approach and sees it as an
extension of the pattern set by Roosevelt." Seib and Otten, supra note 19, at 88.
49. See STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 140 n. 57 (1973).
50. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 106-107.
51. Friedman, Arthur J. Goldberg, 4 FRIEDMAN AND ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 2990 (1969).
52. See HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 589 (1972); HEREN, No HAIL, No
FAREWELL 203 (1970); SCHMIDHAUSER & BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS: CONFLICT
AND INTERACTION 1945-1968, at 118 (1972).
53. See Mason, Pyrrhic Victory: The Defeat of Abe Fortas, 45 VA. Q. REV. 19, 23 (1969).
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ment and confirmation, Fortas still advised the President on critical strategy in Vietnam; and as a strong hawkish voice in Johnson's inner circle of
advisors, Fortas went so far to suggest a military escalation in Vietnam
after the 1968 Tet offensive. 54 Finding displeasure with Johnson's Southeast Asia policy therefore was tantamount to disapproval of the advice
offered by Fortas 5 Thus, the switch on the Court from Goldberg to Fortas
did nothing but install a Johnsonian presence on the Court where none had
-existed.
A

CONCLUSION

Ninety-four Supreme Court justices preceded Abe Fortas through the
marble columns of the nation's highest court. The contrast of black robes
against the white marble belies the truth of Holmes' adage: "We [the
Supreme Court] are very quiet there but it is the quiet of a storm center." 56
When Abe Fortas took his Court seat, turbulence followed. It was a different storm from what Holmes envisioned, and a storm with reverberations
bounding off the already weakened walls of an American society in the
mid-to-late 1960's. Today, when Abe Fortas is mentioned, the stock answer
is the same: "Wasn't he the guy who got his fingers caught in the till and
...

?"

The Supreme Court deserves better. So does Abe Fortas.

Where did the fault lie? Abe Fortas' nomination was a 20th century
carryover from Andrew Jackson's kitchen cabinet and the spoils system.
The Supreme Court is too fragile an institution, in fact and in fiction, to
be used for the oldest pawn game known to the political system. Fortas was
not the first "buddy" of a President to be elevated to the Court. There was
even talk, before the leak in the Watergate dam became too large to contain, that Richard Nixon would appoint John Mitchell, an old friend and
protege, to the Court. And Gerald Ford was said to be seriously considering
the appointment of his old friend, Senator Robert Griffin, to the vacated
Douglas seat. The difference lies in the different actors playing the part
and the different times in which they played their roles. But the precarious
factors involved in such chance appointments cannot be the guide by
which to follow in Supreme Court appointments.
54. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 589 (1972); HEREN, No HAIL, No FAREWELL
203 (1970). Halberstam wrote: "[During the crucial months before he went to the Supreme
Court and even after, Fortas was in constant contact with the President, Johnson phoning
him almost every night and replaying the day's events, listening to Fortas' wisdom. Fortas
was a tower of strength, a pillar of hawkishness, a man of few doubts about the wisdom of
going forward, and Fortas would remind Johnson that no President had ever lost a war, that
the political consequences of withdrawal [in Vietnam] were terrible." (Emphasis supplied.)
55. "Mr. Justice Fortas brought down the wrath of many, apparently because he gave
unpopular advice to an unpopular president, which is thought to be different from giving
popular advice to a popular president." KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 47 (1970).
56. Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 292 (1920).
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A number of factors contributed to Fortas' ultimate failure and resignation from the Court. The chemistry of the Johnson-Fortas formula itself,
a growing concern over American blood flowing far off in a looking-glass
war and the sudden awareness of college students-an awareness long
before discovered and practiced by their European counterparts57 - that
perhaps something was wrong in the heart of American society. Added to
this recipe was the fact that Fortas was the alter ego of Lyndon Johnson.
Thus, when Lyndon Johnson nominated Abe Fortas in 1968 to replace
retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Senate and the public were not
willing to so easily accede to Johnson's commands. The attacks on Fortas
then were as much attacks on Johnson. Much had indeed occurred in the
three years since the Fortas appointment. And in May of 1969 when the
Abe Fortas-Louis Wolfson dealings became public, Fortas plummeted with
a steady barrage of criticism and condemnation, and ultimately resigned.
There was never any question concerning intellectual ability. What Abe
Fortas could do so well in life outside the Court was not so well suited,
however, for the judiciary. He was a wheeler-dealer in Washington legal
circles. He was the managing force behind one of Washington's most powerful law firms. His footsteps were quite familiar to many high governmental corridors. But the Supreme Court was the jealous mistress. It demanded the full and detached attention of its suitors. In the end, neither
Johnson nor Fortas understood this. A willing Senate, which had confirmed Fortas, concurred in the mistake. In the final analysis the downfall
of Justice Abe Fortas began that day in 1965 when Lyndon Johnson decided to appoint his friend to the Supreme Court. It was how Abe Fortas
became an Associate Justice that spun the web of his own judicial demise.
One commentator has remarked: "But as a symbol of the system itself,
there is no one like him. His life, his career and his mentality perfectly
express what America is about: idealistic, rich, imaginative, ambitious and finally self-defeating. '"" What the Fortas story has taught us is both a
history and a lesson to be learned. The lesson is that these types of friendship appointments must be eliminated and that cronyism of this sort has
outlived its usefulness. The country and the Court were lucky until 1965.
Friendship appointments had produced many justices, but the taint of
scandal remarkably avoided the Court. A new Watergate consciousness
forced us to put aside the Fortas fate, but the fact remains. The Fortas
debacle is the primary example that a new, systematic selection of Su57. While on the Court Fortas responded to student protest over the war, particularly
aimed at Lyndon Johnson. In his book ON CIVIL DISOBEDIEN'CE AND DISSENT, published in 1968,
Fortas recognized the need for protest and dissent although he deplored the violence and
staunchly held to the position that such dissent could not in the final analysis aim itself at
the destruction of the foundations of American society. In a sense, however, Fortas came to
the defense of Johnson by maintaining that there must be a reason for dissent which, in
Fortas' view, was not present in the late 1960's.
58. Kopkind, The Significance of Abe Fortas, NEw STATESMAN, Sept. 20, 1968, at 340.
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preme Court justices is in order. The approach taken by Gerald Ford was
an enlightened exercise in presidential and constitutional power, a step in
the right direction and a marked contrast to the 1965 Fortas appointment.
Ford initiated a public and systematic effort to solicit wide recommendations before making his selection.
Using this approach as a fountainhead, the responsibility of submitting
the names of qualified jurists for the Supreme Court should rest with
organizations such as the Appellate Judges' Conference, the National College of the State Judiciary, the American Judicature Society and the Justice Department. Various committees within each of these organizations
could be assembled for the purpose of selecting a list of qualified candidates. All potential nominees should, however, come from the ranks of
either the federal or state judiciaries. These names would then be presented to the American Bar Association and the National Bar Association
for their evaluation and recommendation. These groups would place the
candidates into some kind of order or ranking. Then the President would
get this list with the recommendation. These general recommendations
should be made public so that a President could not totally disregard the
advice of these legal organizations. At that point the President could consider experience, age, party background, if any, and religious and geographical factors that always play some role in the selection process."
This type of procedure would be deliberate and more effective. There
would also be less chance that the ultimate nominee would not surmount
the Senate's advice and consent. For the nominees, selected from the rolls
of judges, would be much less under the aegis of political obligations. And
in limiting nominees to those already judges, more of the influence in the
streams of political compromise could be eliminated. However, the real
selling point in such a program arises because the individuals and groups
closely associated with the law would be the ones primarily responsible for
determining the individuals and their qualifications for the office. These
are the people in the best position to know. A planned systematic and
procedurally public method of selecting a Supreme Court justice should
absolutely be followed in our next 200 or 2,000 years of existence.
The Supreme Court demands and breeds a different brand of person.
Progeny from the judicial ranks are the best suited for that voice of nine
which so often affect our lives. The Court should be in-breeded with judi59. For a broad analytical discussion as to what considerations may be entered into when
selecting a Supreme Court Justice, see generally Note, The Politics of the Appointment
Process: An Analysis of Why Learned Hand Was Never Appointed to the Supreme Court, 25
STAN. L. Rv. 251 (1973). Cf. Carman, The President,Politics and the Power of Appointment:
Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L. Rav. 616 (1969). One source defined
cronyism as a "partiality to cronies, esp. as evidenced in the appointing of political hangerson to office without due regard being taken of their qualifications." WEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 539 (1961).
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cial personalities. It is a clique, almost its own royal family. It is a closed
society of brethren which should, and must, remain inviolate as much as
possible.

